On Being Simple Minded by Carruthers, Peter
ON BEING SIMPLE MINDED 
Peter Carruthers 
 
The question ‘Do fishes think?’ does not exist among our 
applications of language, it is not raised. (Wittgenstein.) 
 
1.  ON HAVING A MIND 
How simple minded can you be? Many philosophers would answer: no more simple than a 
language-using human being. Many other philosophers, and most cognitive scientists, 
would allow that mammals, and perhaps birds, possess minds. But few have gone to the 
extreme of believing that very simple organisms, such as insects, can be genuinely minded.1 
This is the ground that the present paper proposes to occupy and defend. It will argue that 
ants and bees, in particular, possess minds. So it will be claiming that minds can be very 
simple indeed. 
 What does it take to be a minded organism? Davidson (1975) says: you need to be 
an interpreter of the speech and behavior of another minded organism. Only creatures that 
speak, and that both interpret and are subject to interpretation, count as genuinely thinking 
anything at all. McDowell (1994) says: you need to exist in a space of reasons. Only 
creatures capable of appreciating the normative force of a reason for belief, or a reason for 
action, can count as possessing beliefs or engaging in intentional action. And Searle (1992) 
says: you need consciousness. Only creatures that have conscious beliefs and conscious 
desires can count as having beliefs or desires at all. 
                                                 
1 One notable philosophical exception is Tye (1997). While the present paper shares some of Tye’s 
conclusions (specifically, that honey bees have beliefs and desires) it offers different arguments. And the 
main focus of Tye’s paper is on the question whether insects have phenomenally conscious experiences. 
This is quite another question from ours. Whether bees are belief / desire reasoners is one thing; whether 
they are phenomenally conscious is quite another. For a negative verdict on the latter issue, see Carruthers, 
2000. It should also be stressed that the main question before us in this paper is quite different from the ones 
that formed the focus of Bennett’s famous discussion of honey bee behavior (Bennett, 1964). Bennett 
argued that bee signaling systems aren’t a genuine language, and that honey bees aren’t genuinely rational 
in the fully-fledged sense of ‘rationality’ that is distinctive of human beings. (His purpose was to build 
towards an analysis of the latter notion.) Our concern, rather, is just with the question whether bees have 
beliefs and desires. (On this question, Bennett expressed no clear opinion.) 
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Such views seem to the present author to be ill-motivated. Granted, humans speak 
and interpret the speech of others. And granted, humans weigh up and evaluate reasons for 
belief and for action. And granted, too, humans engage in forms of thinking that have all of 
the hallmarks of consciousness. But there are no good reasons for insisting that these 
features of the human mind are necessary conditions of mindedness as such. Or so, at least, 
this paper will briefly argue now, and then take for granted as an assumption in what 
follows. 
Common sense has little difficulty with the idea that there can be beliefs and desires 
that fail to meet these demanding conditions. This suggests, at least, that those conditions 
aren’t conceptually necessary ones. Most people feel pretty comfortable in ascribing simple 
beliefs and desires to non-language-using creatures. They will say, for example, that a 
particular ape acts as she does because she believes that the mound contains termites and 
wants to eat them. And our willingness to entertain such thoughts seems unaffected by the 
extent to which we think that the animal in question can appreciate the normative 
implications of its own states of belief and desire. Moreover, most of us are now (post-
Freud and the cognitive turn in cognitive science) entirely willing to countenance the 
existence of beliefs and desires that aren’t conscious ones. 
It isn’t only ordinary folk who think that beliefs and desires can exist in the absence 
of the stringent requirements laid down by some philosophers. Many cognitive scientists 
and comparative psychologists would agree. (Although sometimes, admittedly, the 
language of ‘belief’ and ‘desire’ gets omitted in deference to the sensibilities of some 
philosophical audiences.) There is now a rich and extensive body of literature on the 
cognitive states and processes of non-human animals (e.g. Walker, 1983; Gallistel, 1990; 
Gould and Gould, 1994). And this literature is replete with talk of information-bearing 
conceptualized states that guide planning and action-selection (beliefs), as well as states 
that set the ends planned for and that motivate action (desires).  
True enough, it can often be difficult to say quite what an animal believes or 
desires. And many of us can, on reflection, rightly be made to feel uncomfortable when 
using a that-clause constructed out of our human concepts to describe the thoughts of an 
animal. If we say of an ape that she believes that the mound contains termites, for example, 
then we can easily be made to feel awkward about so doing. For how likely is it that the ape 
will have the concept termite? Does the ape distinguish between termites and ants, for 
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instance, while also believing that both kinds belong to the same super-ordinate category 
(insects)? Does the ape really believe that termites are living things which excrete and 
reproduce? And so on. 
These considerations give rise to an argument against the very possibility of non-
linguistic thought, which was initially presented by Davidson (1975). The argument claims 
first, that beliefs and desires are content-bearing states whose contents must be expressible 
in a sentential complement (a that-clause). Then second, the argument points out that it 
must always be inappropriate to use sentential complements that embed our concepts when 
describing the thoughts of an animal (given the absence of linguistic behavior of the 
appropriate sorts). In which case (putting these two premises together) it follows that 
animals cannot be said to have thoughts at all. 
The error in this argument lies in its assumption that thought contents must be 
specifiable by means of that-clauses, however. For this amounts to the imposition of a co-
thinking constraint on genuine thoughthood. In order for another creature (whether human 
or animal) to be thinking a particular thought, it would have to be the case that someone 
else should also be capable of entertaining that very thought, in such a way that it can be 
formulated into a that-clause. But why should we believe this? For we know that there are 
many thoughts − e.g. some of Einstein’s thoughts, or some of the thoughts of Chomsky − 
that we may be incapable of entertaining. And why should we nevertheless think that the 
real existence of those thoughts is contingent upon the capacity of someone else to co-think 
them? Perhaps Einstein had some thoughts so sophisticated that there is no one else who is 
capable of entertaining their content. 
The common-sense position is that (in addition to being formulated and co-thought 
from the inside, through a that-clause) thoughts can equally well be characterized from the 
outside, by means of an indirect description. In the case of the ape dipping for termites, for 
example, most of us would, on reflection, say something like this: we don’t know how 
much the ape knows about termites, nor how exactly she conceptualizes them, but we do 
know that she believes of the termites in that mound that they are there, and we know that 
she wants to eat them. And on this matter common sense and cognitive science agree. 
Through careful experimentation scientists can map the boundaries of a creature’s concepts, 
and can explore the extent of its knowledge of the things with which it deals (Bermúdez, 
2003). These discoveries can then be used to provide an external characterization of the 
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creature’s beliefs and goals, even if the concepts in question are so alien to us that we 
couldn’t co-think them with the creature in the content of a that-clause. 
What does it take to be a minded organism, then? We should say instead: you need 
to possess a certain core cognitive architecture. Having a mind means being a subject of 
perceptual states, where those states are used to inform a set of belief states which guide 
behavior, and where the belief states in turn interact with a set of desire states in ways that 
depend upon their contents, to select from amongst an array of action schemata so as to 
determine the form of the behavior. This sort of belief / desire architecture is one that 
humans share. It is represented diagrammatically in figure 1. 
 
Insert figures 1 & 2 about here 
 
The crucial components of this account are the beliefs and desires. For it is unlikely 
that possession of perceptual states alone, where those states are used to guide a suite of 
innate behavioral programs or fixed action schemata, could be sufficient for a creature to 
count as possessing a mind. Consider the architecture represented in figure 2. The innate 
behaviors of many mammals, birds, reptiles, and insects can be explained in such terms. 
The releasing factors for an innate behavior will often include both bodily states (e.g. 
pregnancy) and perceptual information, with the perceptual states serving to guide the 
detailed performance of the behavior in question, too.2 (Consider a butterfly landing neatly 
on a leaf to lay her eggs.) But engaging in a suite of innately coded action patterns isn’t 
enough to count as having a mind, even if the detailed performance of those patterns is 
guided by perceptual information. And nor, surely, is the situation any different if the 
action patterns aren’t innate ones, but are, rather, acquired habits, learned through some 
                                                 
2 Do informational states that don’t interact with beliefs and desires deserve to be counted as genuine 
perceptions? Common sense suggests that they do. Ask someone whether they think that the fish sees the 
net sweeping towards it through the water and they will answer, ‘Of course, because it swims deftly in such 
a way at to avoid it.’ But ask whether the fish has thoughts about the net or its own impending capture, and 
many will express skepticism. Moreover, the ‘dual systems’ theory of vision (Milner and Goodale, 1995; 
Clark, 2002) suggests that the perceptual states that guide our own movements on-line aren’t available for 
belief or desire formation, either. Yet we wouldn’t deny, even so, that our detailed movements occur as they 
do because we see the shapes and orientations of the objects surrounding us. 
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form of conditioning. 
This paper will assume that it isn’t enough for an organism to count as having a 
mind, either, that the animal in question should be merely interpretable as possessing 
beliefs and desires. For as Dennett (1987) has taught us, we can adopt what he calls ‘the 
intentional stance’ in respect of even the most rigidly pre-programmed of behaviors. No, 
the architecture represented in figure 1 needs to be construed realistically. There needs to 
be a real distinction between the belief-states and the desire-states, in virtue of which they 
possess their distinctive causal roles (guiding and motivating action, respectively). And 
these states must, in addition, be both discrete, and structured in a way that reflects their 
semantic contents. And their detailed causal roles, too (the ways in which particular belief 
states and particular desire states interact) must be sensitive to those structural features. 
Dennett (1991) thinks that only language can provide these properties. It is only 
with the first appearance of the Joycean machine − the stream of inner verbalization that 
occupies so much of our waking lives − that humans come to have discrete structured 
semantically-evaluable states, where the interactions of those states are sensitive to their 
structures. So although Dennett might say that many animals possess simple minds, all he 
really means is that their behavior is rich enough to make it worth our while to adopt the 
intentional stance towards them. But he denies that non-human animals possess minds 
realistically construed, in the way that the present paper proposes to construe them. 
To be minded means to be a thinker, then. And that means (it will hereafter be 
assumed) having distinct belief states and desire states that are discrete, structured, and 
causally efficacious in virtue of their structural properties. These are demanding conditions 
on mindedness. The question is: how simple can an organism be while still having states 
with these features? 
 
2.  MEANS / ENDS REASONING IN RATS 
Dickinson and colleagues have conducted an elegant series of experiments, reported in a 
number of influential papers, providing evidence for the view that rats, at least, are genuine 
means / ends reasoners (Dickinson and Balleine, 1994; Dickinson and Shanks, 1995; 
Dickinson and Balleine, 2000). They argue that rats engage in goal-directed behavior, 
guided by beliefs about causal contingencies, and by goals that are only linked to basic 
forms of motivation via learning. (We, too, have to monitor our own reactions to learn what 
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we want; Damasio, 1994.) These arguments are convincing. But at the same time Dickinson 
advances a particular conception of what it takes to be a truly minded creature. The latter 
will need to be resisted if the position that insects have minds is to be defensible. 
 Here are some of the data (Dickinson and Balleine, 2000). Rats don’t press a lever 
for food any more when hungry than when nearly satiated, unless they have had experience 
of eating that food when hungry. While the reward-value of the food is something that they 
know, the increased value that attaches to food when hungry is something that they have to 
learn. Similarly, rats caused to have an aversion to one food rather than another (via the 
injection of an emetic shortly after eating the one food but not the other) will thereafter stop 
performing a trained action causally paired with just that food, in the absence of feedback 
resulting from its actions (i.e. without receiving any rewards). However, they will do so 
only if they have been re-presented with the relevant food in the interval. They have to 
learn that they now have an aversion to the food in question. But once learned, they make 
appropriate decisions about which of two previously learned actions to perform − they 
know which action will make them sick, and choose accordingly. 
 Dickinson thinks that the data warrant ascribing to rats a two-tier motivational 
system much like our own. There is a basic level of biological drives, which fixes the 
reward value of experiences received. And there is an intentional level of represented goals 
(e.g. to eat this stuff rather than that stuff), which has to be linked up to the basic level via 
learning to achieve its motivating status. Others have made similar proposals to explain 
aspects of the human motivational system (Damasio, 1994; Rolls, 1999). 
 In other experiments Dickinson and colleagues have shown that rats are sensitive to 
the degree of causal efficacy of their actions (Dickinson and Charnock, 1985; Dickinson 
and Shanks, 1995). In particular, the rat’s rate of action drops as the causal connection 
between act and outcome falls. It even turns out that rats display exactly the same illusions 
of causality as do humans. The set-up in these experiments is that the probability of an 
event occurring (e.g. a figure appearing on a TV monitor, for the humans) or a reward 
being delivered (for the rats) is actually made independent of the action to be performed 
(pressing the space-bar, pressing a lever), while sometimes occurring in a way that happens 
to be temporally paired with that action. If (but only if) the unpaired outcomes are signaled 
in some way (by a coincident sound, say), then both rats and humans continue to believe 
(and to behave) as if the connection between act and outcome were a causal one. 
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 The conclusion drawn from these and similar studies, then, is that rats are genuine 
means / ends reasoners. They possess learned representations of the goals they are trying to 
achieve (e.g. to receive a particular type of food). And they have acquired representations 
of the relative causal efficacy of the actions open to them. Taken together, these 
representations will lead them (normally, when not fooled by cunning experimenters) to act 
appropriately. However, Dickinson and colleagues claim that only creatures with these 
abilities can count as being genuinely minded, or as possessing a belief / desire cognitive 
architecture of the sort depicted in figure 1 (Heyes and Dickinson, 1990; Dickinson and 
Balleine, 2000). Their reasoning is that otherwise the animal’s behavior will be explicable 
in terms of mere innate motor programs or learned habits created through some form of 
associative conditioning. These further claims are unwarranted, however, as we shall see. 
 
3.  NON-ASSOCIATIVE LEARNING AND NON-CAUSAL INSTRUMENTAL REASONING 
Dickinson assumes that if behavior isn’t caused by means / ends reasoning in the above 
sense, then it must either be innate or the product of associative conditioning. But this 
assumption is false. The animal world is rife with non-associative forms of learning 
(Gallistel, 1990). Many animals (including the Tunisian desert ant) can navigate by dead 
reckoning, for example. This requires the animal to compute the value of a variable each 
time it turns − integrating the direction in which it has just been traveling (as calculated 
from the polarization of the sun’s light in the sky; Wehner, 1994), with an estimate of the 
distance traveled in that direction, to produce a representation of current position in relation 
a point of origin (home base, say). This plainly isn’t conditioned behavior of any sort; and 
nor can it be explained in terms of associative mechanisms, unless those mechanisms are 
organized into an architecture that is then tantamount to algorithmic symbol processing 
(Marcus, 2001). 
 Similarly, many kinds of animal will construct mental maps of their environment 
which they use when navigating; and they update the properties of the map through 
observation without conditioning (Gould and Gould, 1994).3 Many animals can adopt the 
                                                 
3 Other animals navigate by the stars, or by using the Earth’s magnetic field. Night-migrating birds study the 
sky at night when they are chicks in the nest, thereby extracting a representation of the center of rotation of 
the stars in the night sky. When they later leave the nest, they use this information to guide them when 
flying south (in fall in the northern hemisphere) and again when flying north (in spring in the northern 
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shortest route to a target (e.g. a source of food), guided by landmarks and covering ground 
never before traveled. This warrants ascribing to the animals a mental map of their 
environment. But they will also update the properties of the map on an on-going basis.  
Food-caching birds, for example, can recall the positions of many hundreds or 
thousands of hidden seeds after some months; but they generally won’t return to a cache 
location that they have previously emptied. Similarly, rats can be allowed to explore a maze 
on one day, finding a food reward in both a small dark room and a large white one. Next 
day they are given food in a (distinct) large white room, and shocked in a small dark one. 
When replaced back in the maze a day later they go straight to the white room and avoid 
the dark one (Gould and Gould, 1994). Having learned that dark rooms might deliver a 
shock, they have updated their representation of the properties of the maze accordingly.4
 Many animals make swift calculations of relative reward abundance, too, in a way 
that isn’t explicable via conditioning. For example, a flock of ducks will distribute 1:1 or 
1:2 in front of two feeders throwing food at rates of 1:1 or 1:2 within one minute of the 
onset of feeding, during which time many ducks get no food at all, and very few of them 
experience rewards from both sources (Harper, 1982). Similarly, both pigeons and rats on a 
variable reward schedule from two different alcoves will match their behavior to the 
changing rates of reward. They respond very rapidly, closely tracking random variations in 
the immediately preceding rates (Dreyfus, 1991; Mark and Gallistel, 1994). They certainly 
aren’t averaging over previous reinforcements, as associationist models would predict. 
Gallistel and colleagues have argued, indeed, that even classical conditioning − the 
very heartland of associationist general-purpose learning models − is better explained in 
terms of the computational operations of a specialized rate-estimating foraging system 
(Gallistel, 1990, 2000; Gallistel and Gibbon, 2001). One simple point they make is that 
animals on a delayed reinforcement schedule in which the rewards only become available 
once the conditioned stimulus (e.g. an illuminated panel) has been present for a certain 
amount of time, will only respond on each occasion after a fixed proportion of the interval 
                                                                                                                                                    
hemisphere). The representations in question are learned, not innate, as can be demonstrated by rearing 
chicks in a planetarium where they observe an artificially generated center of night-sky rotation. 
4 Similarly, western scrub jays will update the representations on their map of cached foods, and behave 
accordingly, once they learn independently of the different decay rates of different types of food. Thereafter 
they access the faster-decaying caches first. See Clayton et al., 2003. 
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has elapsed. This is hard to explain if the animals are merely building an association 
between the illuminated panel and the reward. It seems to require, in fact, that they should 
construct a representation of the reinforcement intervals, and act accordingly. 
 Moreover, there are many well-established facts about conditioning behaviors that 
are hard to explain on associationist models, but that are readily explicable within a 
computational framework. For example, delay of reinforcement has no effect on rate of 
acquisition so long as the intervals between trials are increased by the same proportions. 
And the number of reinforcements required for acquisition of a new behavior isn’t affected 
by interspersing a significant number of unreinforced trials. This is hard to explain if the 
animals are supposed to be building associations, since the unreinforced trials should surely 
weaken those associations. But it can be predicted if what the animals are doing is 
estimating relative rates of return. For the rate of reinforcement per stimulus presentation 
relative to the rate of reinforcement in background conditions remains the same, whether or 
not significant numbers of stimulus presentations remain unreinforced. 
 There are many forms of learning in animals that aren’t simply learned associations, 
then. And consequently there are many animal behaviors that aren’t mere habits, but that 
don’t involve representations of causality, either. A bird who navigates to a previously 
established food cache, using landmarks and a mental map on which the location of the 
cache is represented, certainly isn’t acting out of habit. But then nor does the action involve 
any explicit representation of the causality of the bird’s own behavior. The bird doesn’t 
have to think, ‘Flying in that direction will cause me to be in that place.’ It just has to 
integrate its perception of the relevant landmarks with the representations on its mental 
map, then keying into action the flying-in-that-direction action schema. The causation can 
be (and surely is) left implicit in the bird’s action schemata and behaviors, not explicitly 
represented in the bird’s reasoning.5
 But for all that, why shouldn’t such animals count as exemplifying the belief / 
desire architecture depicted in figure 1? If the animal can put together a variety of goals 
with the representations on a mental map, say, and act accordingly, they why shouldn’t we 
say that the animal behaves as it does because it wants something and believes that the 
                                                 
5 The same is surely true of humans. When one wants a beer and recalls that there is a beer in the fridge, and 
then sets out for the kitchen, one doesn’t explicitly represent one’s walking as the cause of one getting the 
beer. Rather, once one knows the location, one just starts to walk. 
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desired thing can be found at a certain represented location on the map? There seems to be 
no good reason why we shouldn’t. (And nor is there any good reason to insist that an 
animal only has genuine desires if its goals are acquired through learning.) Dickinson is 
surely misled in thinking that means / ends reasoning has to involve representations of 
causal, rather than merely spatial, ‘means’.6  
 The difference between rats and many other animals is just that rats (like humans) 
are generalist foragers and problem solvers. For this reason they have to learn the value of 
different foods, and they are especially good at learning what acts will cause rewards to be 
delivered. But unlearned values can still steer intentional behavior, guided by maps and 
other learned representations of location and direction. And so there can, surely, be minds 
that are simpler than the mind of a rat. 
 
4.  INSECTS (1): INFLEXIBLE FIXED ACTION PATTERNS 
How simple minded can you be? Do insects, in particular, have beliefs and desires? Few 
seem inclined to answer, ‘Yes.’ In part this derives from a tradition of thought (traceable 
back at least to Descartes) of doubting whether even higher mammals such as apes and 
monkeys have minds. And in part it derives from the manifest rigidity of much insect 
behavior. The tradition will here be ignored. (Some aspects of it have been discussed 
briefly in section 1 above.) But the rigidity requires some comment. 
We are all familiar with examples of the behavioral rigidity of insects. Consider the 
tick, which sits immobile on its perch until it detects butyric acid vapor, whereupon it 
releases its hold (often enough falling onto the bodies of mammals passing below, whose 
skins emit such a vapor); and then when it detects warmth, it burrows. Or there are the 
caterpillars who follow the light to climb trees to find food, in whom the mechanism that 
enables them to do this is an extremely simple one: when more light enters one eye than the 
other, the legs on that side of its body move slower, causing the animal to turn towards the 
                                                 
6 Bermúdez (2003), too, claims that there can be no genuine decision-making (and so no real belief / desire 
psychology) in the absence of representations of instrumental causality. And this seems to be because he, 
too, assumes that there are no forms of learning between classical kinds of conditioning and genuine causal 
belief. But given the reality of a variety of forms of spatial learning (reviewed briefly above), it seems 
unmotivated to insist that sophisticated navigation behaviors aren’t really guided by decision-making, 
merely on the grounds that there are no causal beliefs involved. 
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source of the light. When artificial lighting is provided at the bottom of the trees, the 
caterpillars climb downwards and subsequently starve to death. And when blinded in one 
eye, these animals will move constantly in circles. How dumb can you be! Right? 
Even apparently sophisticated and intelligent sequences of behavior can turn out, on 
closer investigation, to be surprisingly rigid. There is the well-known example of the Sphex 
wasp, that leaves a paralyzed cricket in a burrow with its eggs, so that its offspring will 
have something to feed on when they hatch. When it captures a cricket, it drags it to the 
entrance of the burrow, then leaves it outside for a moment while it enters, seemingly to 
check for intruders. However, if an interfering experimenter moves the cricket back a few 
inches while the wasp is inside, she repeats the sequence: dragging the insect to the 
burrow’s entrance, then entering briefly once more alone. And this sequence can be made 
to ‘loop’ indefinitely many times over. 
Or consider the Australian digger wasp, that builds an elaborate tower-and-bell 
structure over the entrance of the burrow in which she lays her eggs (Gould and Gould, 
1994). (The purpose of the structure is to prevent a smaller species of parasitic wasp from 
laying her eggs in the same burrow. The bell is of such a size and hung at such an angle, 
and worked so smooth on the inside, that the smaller wasp cannot either reach far enough 
in, or gain enough purchase, to enter.) She builds the tower three of her own body-lengths 
high. If the tower is progressively buried while she builds, she will keep on building. But 
once she has finished the tower and started on the bell, the tower can be buried without her 
noticing − with disastrous results, since the bell will then be half on the ground, and 
consequently quite useless. Similarly, if a small hole is drilled in the neck of the tower, she 
seems to lack the resources to cope with a minor repair. Instead she builds another tower 
and bell structure, constructed on top of the hole. 
In order to explain such behaviors, we don’t need to advance beyond the 
architecture of figure 2. The digger wasp would seem to have an innately represented series 
of nested behavioral sub-routines, with the whole sequence being triggered by its own 
bodily state (pregnancy). Each sub-routine is guided by perceptual input, and is finished by 
a simple stopping-rule. But once any given stage is completed, there is no going back to 
make corrections or repairs. The wasp appears to have no conception of the overall goal of 
the sequence, nor any beliefs about the respective contributions made by the different 
elements. If this were the full extent of the flexibility of insect behaviors, then there would 
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be no warrant for believing that insects have minds at all. 
It turns out that even flexibility of behavioral strategy isn’t really sufficient for a 
creature to count as having a mind, indeed. For innate behavioral programs can have a 
conditional format. It used to be thought, for example, that all male crickets sing to attract 
mates. But this isn’t so; and for good reason. For singing exposes crickets to predation, and 
also makes them targets for parasitic flies who drop their eggs on them. Many male crickets 
adopt the alternative strategy of waiting silently as a satellite of a singing male, and 
intercepting and attempting to mate with any females attracted by the song. But the two 
different strategies aren’t fixed. A previously silent male may begin to sing if one or more 
of the singing males is removed (Gould and Gould, 1994). 
Admittedly, such examples suggest that something like a decision process must be 
built into the structure of the behavioral program. There must be some mechanism that 
takes information about, for example, the cricket’s own size and condition, the ratio of 
singing to non-singing males in the vicinity, and the loudness and vigor of their songs, and 
then triggers into action one behavioral strategy or the other. But computational complexity 
of this sort, in the mechanism that triggers an innate behavior, isn’t the same as saying that 
the insect acts from its beliefs and desires. And the latter is what mindedness requires, we 
are assuming. 
 
5.  INSECTS (2): A SIMPLE BELIEF / DESIRE PSYCHOLOGY 
From the fact that many insect behaviors result from triggering of innately represented 
sequences of perceptually guided activity, however, it doesn’t follow that all do. And it is 
surely no requirement on mindedness that every behavior of a minded creature should result 
from interactions of belief states with desire states. Indeed, some of our own behaviors are 
triggered fixed action sequences − think of sneezing or coughing, for example, or of the 
universal human disgust reaction, which involves fixed movements of the mouth and 
tongue seemingly designed to expel noxious substances from the oral cavity. So it remains 
a possibility that insects might have simple minds as well as a set of triggerable innately 
represented action sequences.  
In effect, it remains a possibility that insects might exemplify the cognitive 
architecture depicted in figure 1, only with an arrow added between ‘body states’ and 
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‘action schemata’ to subserve a dual causal route to behavior (see figure 3).7 In what 
follows it will be argued that this is indeed the case, focusing on the minds of honey bees in 
particular. While this paper won’t make any attempt to demonstrate this, it seems likely that 
the conclusion we reach in the case of honey bees will generalize to all navigating insects. 
In which case belief / desire cognitive architectures are of very ancient ancestry indeed. 
 
Insert figure 3 about here 
 
Like many other insects, bees use a variety of navigation systems. One is dead 
reckoning (integrating a sequence of directions of motion with the velocity traveled in each 
direction, to produce a representation of one’s current location in relation to the point of 
origin). This in turn requires that bees can learn the expected position of the sun in the sky 
at any given time of day, as measured by an internal clock of some sort. Another 
mechanism permits bees can recognize and navigate from landmarks, either distant or local 
(Collett and Collett, 2002). And some researchers have claimed that bees will, in addition, 
construct crude mental maps of their environment from which they can navigate. (The maps 
have to be crude because of the poor resolution of bee eyesight. But they may still contain 
the relative locations of salient landmarks, such as a large free-standing tree, a forest edge, 
or a lake shore.) 
Gould (1986) reports, for example, that when trained to a particular food source, 
and then carried from the hive in a dark box to new release point, the bees will fly directly 
to the food, but only if there is a significant landmark in their vicinity when they are 
released. (Otherwise they fly off on the compass bearing that would previously have led 
from the hive to the food.) While other scientists have been unable to replicate these 
experiments directly, Menzel et al. (2000) found that bees that had never foraged more than 
a few meters from the nest, but who were released at random points much further from it, 
were able to return home swiftly. They argue that this either indicates the existence of a 
map-like structure, built during the bees’ initial orientation flights before they had begun 
                                                 
7 Note that if the ‘dual visual systems’ hypothesis of Milner and Goodale (1995) generalizes to other 
perceptual modalities and to other species, then there should really be two distinct ‘percept boxes’ in figure 
3, one feeding into conceptual thought and decision making, and another feeding into the action schemata so 
as to provide fine-grained on-line guidance of movement. 
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foraging, or else the learned association of vectors-to-home with local landmarks. But 
either way, they claim, the spatial representations in question are allocentric rather than 
egocentric in character. 
As is well known, honey bees dance to communicate information of various sorts to 
other bees. The main elements of the code have now been uncovered through patient 
investigation (Gould and Gould, 1988). They generally dance in a figure-of-eight pattern on 
a vertical surface in the dark inside the hive. The angle of movement through the center of 
the figure of eight, as measured from the vertical, corresponds to the angle from the 
expected direction of the sun for the time of day. (E.g. a dance angled at 30o to the right of 
vertical at midday would represent 30o west of south, in the northern hemisphere.) And the 
number of ‘waggles’ made through the center of the figure of eight provides a measure of 
distance. (Different bee species use different innately fixed measures of waggles-to-
distance.) 
Honey bees have a number of innately structured learning mechanisms, in fact. 
They have one such mechanism for learning the position of the sun in the sky for the time 
of day. (This mechanism − like the human language faculty − appears to have an innate 
‘universal grammar’. All bees in the northern hemisphere are born knowing that the sun is 
in the east in the morning, and in the west in the afternoon; Dyer and Dickinson, 1994.) 
And they have another such mechanism for learning, by dead reckoning, where things are 
in relation to the hive. (Here it is ‘visual flow’ that seems to be used as the measure of 
distance traveled; Srinivasan et al., 2000.) They may have yet another mechanism for 
constructing a mental map from a combination of landmark and directional information. 
(At the very least they have the capacity for learning to associate landmarks with vectors 
pointing to the hive; Menzel et al., 2000.) And they have yet another mechanism again for 
decoding the dances of other bees, extracting a representation of the distance and direction 
of a target (generally nectar, but also pollen, water, tree sap, or the location of a potential 
nest site; Seeley, 1995). 
Although basic bee motivations are, no doubt, innately fixed, the goals they adopt 
on particular occasions (e.g. whether or not to move from one foraging patch to another, 
whether to finish foraging and return to the hive, and whether or not to dance on reaching 
it) would appear to be influenced by a number of factors (Seeley, 1995). Bees are less likely 
to dance for dilute sources of food, for example; they are less likely to dance for the more 
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distant of two sites of fixed value; and they are less likely to dance in the evening or when 
there is an approaching storm, when there is a significant chance that other bees might not 
be capable of completing a return trip. And careful experimentation has shown that bees 
scouting for a new nest site will weigh up a number of factors, including cavity volume, 
shape, size and direction of entrance, height above ground, dampness, draftiness, and 
distance away. Moreover, dancing scouts will sometimes take time out to observe the 
dances of others and check out their discoveries, making a comparative assessment and 
then dancing accordingly (Gould and Gould, 1988). 
Bees don’t just accept and act on any information they are offered, either. On the 
contrary, they evaluate it along a number of dimensions. They check the nature and quality 
of the goal being offered (normally by sampling it, in the case of food). And they factor in 
the distance to the indicated site before deciding whether or not to fly out to it. Most 
strikingly, indeed, it has been claimed that bees will also integrate communicated 
information with the representations on their mental map, rejecting even rich sources of 
food that are being indicated to exist in the middle of a lake, for example.8
 How should these bee capacities be explained? Plainly the processes in question 
can’t be associative ones, and these forms of bee learning aren’t conditioned responses to 
stimuli. Might the bee behaviors be explained through the existence of some sort of 
‘subsumption architecture’ (Brooks, 1986)? That is, instead of having a central belief / 
desire system of the sort depicted in figure 3, might bees have a suite of input-to-output 
modular systems, one for each different type of behavior? This suggestion is wildly 
implausible. For (depending on how one counts behaviors) there would have to be at least 
five of these input-to-output modules (perhaps dozens, if each different ‘goal’ amounts to a 
different behavior), each of which would have to duplicate many of the costly 
computational processes undertaken by the others. There would have to be a scouting-from-
the-hive module, a returning-to-the-hive module, a deciding-to-dance-and-dancing module, 
                                                 
8 In these experiments two groups of bees were trained to fly to weak sugar solutions equidistant from the 
hive, one on a boat in the middle of a lake, and one on the lake shore. When both sugar solutions were 
increased dramatically, both sets of bees danced on returning to the hive. None of the receiving bees flew 
out across the lake. But this wasn’t just a reluctance to fly over water. In experiments where the boat was 
moved progressively closer and closer to the far lake shore, more and more receiving bees were prepared to 
fly to it. See Gould and Gould, 1988. 
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a returning-to-food-source module, and a perception-of-dance-and-flying-to-food-source 
module. Within each of these systems essentially the same computations of direction and 
distance information would have to be undertaken. 
 The only remotely plausible interpretation of the data is that honey bees have a suite 
of information-generating systems that construct representations of the relative directions 
and distances between a variety of substances and properties and the hive,9 as well as a 
number of goal-generating systems taking as inputs body states and a variety of kinds of 
contextual information, and generating a current goal as output. Any one of these goal 
states can then in principle interact with any one of the information states to create a 
potentially unique behavior, never before seen in the life of that particular bee. It appears, 
indeed, that bees exemplify the architecture depicted in figure 3. In which case, there can be 
minds that are capable of just a few dozen types of desire, and that are capable of just a few 
thousand types of belief.10 How simple minded can you be? Pretty simple. 
 
6.  STRUCTURE-DEPENDENT INFERENCE 
Recall, however, that the conditions on genuine mindedness that we laid down in section 1 
included not just a distinction between information states and goal states, but also that these 
states should interact with one another to determine behavior in ways that are sensitive to 
their compositional structures. Now, on the face of it this condition is satisfied. For if one 
and the same item of directional information can be drawn on both to guide a bee in search 
of nectar and to guide the same bee returning to the hive, then it would seem that the bee 
must be capable of something resembling the following pair of practical inferences (using 
BEL to represent belief, DES to represent desire, MOVE to represent action – normally 
flight, but also walking for short distances – and square brackets to represent contents). 
                                                 
9  Note that this satisfies the two criteria laid down by Bennett (1964, §4) for a languageless creature to 
possess beliefs. One is that the creature should be capable of learning. And the other is that the belief-states 
should be sensitive to a variety of different kinds of evidence. 
10 The bee’s capacity for representing spatial relations is by no means unlimited. There is probably an upper 
limit on distances that can be represented. And discriminations of direction are relatively crude (at least, by 
comparison with the almost pin-point accuracy of the Tunisian desert ant; see Wehner and Srinivasan, 
1981). However, bees are also capable of forming a limited range of other sorts of belief, too. They come to 
believe that certain odors and colors signal nectar or pollen, for example (Gould and Gould, 1988). 
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(1) BEL [nectar is 200 meters north of hive] 
 BEL [here is at hive] 
DES [nectar] 
MOVE [200 meters north] 
 
(2) BEL [nectar is 200 meters north of hive] 
BEL [here is at nectar] 
DES [hive] 
MOVE [200 meters south] 
 
These are inferences in which the conclusions depend upon structural relations amongst the 
premises.11
 It might be suggested that we have moved too swiftly, however. For perhaps there 
needn’t be a representation of the goal substance built explicitly into the structure of the 
directional information-state. To see why this might be so, notice that bees don’t represent 
what it is that lies in the direction indicated as part of the content of their dance; and nor do 
observers acquire that information from the dance itself. Rather, dancing bees display the 
value on offer by carrying it; and observing bees know what is on offer by sampling some 
of what the dancing bee is carrying. 
 It might be claimed, then, that what really happens is this. An observing bee 
samples some of the dancing bee’s load, and discovers that it is nectar, say. This keys the 
observer into its fly-in-the-direction-indicated sub-routine. The bee computes the necessary 
information from the details of the dance, and flies off towards the indicated spot. If it is 
lucky, it then discovers nectar-bearing flowers when it gets there and begins to forage. But 
at no point do the contents of goal-states and the contents of the information-states need to 
interact with one another. 
 This idea won’t wash, however. Although the presence of nectar isn’t explicitly 
                                                 
11 Is there some way of specifying in general terms the practical inference rule that is at work here? Indeed 
there is. The rule might be something like the following: BEL [here is at x, F is m meters and no from x], 
DES [F] → MOVE [m meters at no].  This would require the insertion of an extra premise into argument (2) 
above, transforming the first premise into the form, BEL [hive is 200 meters south of nectar]. 
ON BEING SIMPLE MINDED 18
represented in the content of the dance, it does need to be represented in the content of both 
the dancer’s and the observer’s belief-states. For recall that bees don’t dance even for a rich 
source of nectar that is too far away (Gould and Gould, 1988). The distance-information 
therefore needs to be integrated with the substance-information in determining the decision 
to dance. Equally, observers ignore dances indicating even rich sources of nectar if the 
indicated distances are too great. So again, the distance information derived from the dance 
needs to be integrated with the value information before a decision can be reached. So we 
can conclude that not only do bees have distinct information states and goal states, but that 
such states interact with one other in ways that are sensitive to their contents in determining 
behavior. In which case bees really do exemplify the belief / desire architecture depicted in 
figure 3, construed realistically. 
 One final worry remains, however. Do the belief and desire states in question satisfy 
what Evans (1983) calls ‘the Generality Constraint’? This is a very plausible constraint on 
genuine (i.e. compositionally structured) concept possession. It tells us that any concept 
possessed by a thinker must be capable of combining appropriately with any other concept 
possessed by the same thinker. If you can think that a is F and you can think that b is G, 
then you must also be capable of thinking that a is G and that b is F. For these latter 
thoughts are built out of the very same components as the former ones, only combined 
together with one another differently.  
Now, bees can represent the spatial relationships between nectar and hive, and 
between pollen and hive; but are they capable of representing the spatial relationships 
between nectar and pollen? Are bees capable of thoughts of the following form? 
BEL [nectar is 200 meters north of pollen] 
If not, it may be said, then bees can’t be counted as genuine concept-users; and so they 
can’t count as genuine believer / desirers, either. 
 It is possible that this particular example isn’t a problem. Foragers returning to a 
nectar site to find it almost depleted might fly directly to any previously discovered 
foraging site that is nearby; including one containing pollen rather than nectar, if pollen is 
in sufficient demand back at the hive. But there will, almost certainly, be other relationships 
that are never explicitly represented. It is doubtful, for example, that any scout will ever 
explicitly represent the relations between one potential nest site and another (as opposed to 
some such belief being implicit in the information contained in a mental map). So it is 
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doubtful whether any bee will ever form an explicit thought of the form: 
 BEL [cavity A is 200 meters north of cavity B] 
Rather, the bees will form beliefs about the relations between each site and the colony. 
 Such examples aren’t really a problem for the Generality Constraint, however. From 
the fact that bees never form beliefs of a certain kind, it doesn’t follow that they can’t. (Or 
at least, this doesn’t follow in such a way as to undermine the claim that their beliefs are 
compositionally structured.) Suppose, first, that bees do construct genuine mental maps of 
their environment. Then it might just be that bees are only ever interested in the 
relationships amongst potential new nest sites and the existing colony, and not between the 
nest sites themselves. But the same sort of thing is equally true of human beings. Just as 
there are some spatial relationships that might be implicit in a bee’s mental map, but never 
explicitly believed; so there are some things implicit in our beliefs about the world, but 
never explicitly entertained, either, because they are of no interest. Our beliefs, for 
example, collectively entail that mountains are less easy to eat than rocks. (We could at 
least pound a rock up into powder, which we might have some chance of swallowing.) But 
until finding oneself in need of a philosophical example, this isn’t something one would 
ever have bothered to think. Likewise with the bees. The difference is just that bees don’t 
do philosophy.  
 Suppose, on the other hand, that bees don’t construct mental maps; rather they learn 
a variety of kinds of vector information linking food sources (or nest sites) and the hive, 
and linking landmarks and the hive. Then the reason why no bee will ever come to believe 
that one nest-cavity stands in a certain relation to another will have nothing to do with the 
alleged absence of genuine compositional structure from the bees’ belief states, but will 
rather result from the mechanisms that give rise to new bee beliefs, combined with the 
bees’ limited inferential abilities.  
For here once again, part of the explanation is just that bees are only interested in a 
small sub-set of the spatial relations available to them. They only ever compute and encode 
the spatial relationships between desired substances and the hive, or between landmarks 
and the hive, not amongst the locations of those substances or those landmarks themselves. 
And nor do they have the inferential abilities needed to work out the vector and distance 
relations amongst landmarks from their existing spatial beliefs. But these facts give us no 
reason to claim that bees don’t really employ compositionally structured belief states, 
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which they integrate with a variety of kinds of desire state in such a way as to select an 
appropriate behavior. And in particular, the fact that the bees lack the ability to draw 
inferences freely and promiscuously amongst their belief states shouldn’t exclude them 
from having any belief states at all. Which is to say: these facts about the bees’ limitations 
give us no reason for denying that bees possess simple minds. 
 
How simple minded can you be, then? Pretty simple; and a good deal more simple than 
most philosophers seem prepared to allow.12
 
Peter Carruthers, University of Maryland. 
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